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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
ZITY OF ST. GEORGE, ] 
P l a i n t i f f - A p p e l l a n t , ; 
vs. ] 
BRENT ALLEN TURNER, 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l e e . ] 
) No. : 910309 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JUDGES GARFF, JACKSON, and ORME 
The Plaintiff/Appellant, City of St. George, by and through 
counsel, T. W. Shumway, submits the following reply in answer to 
new matters set forth by Appellee in its brief filed on January 27, 
1992. 
1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The most definitive test of obscenity, and the one followed by 
the courts since 1973, forms the basis for the St. George City 
ordinance under which Turner was convicted. That test safeguards 
against derogation of the constitutional right to free expression 
by setting minimum standards. The duty of an appellate court is to 
assure that these standards have been met or exceeded before a jury 
makes determination of the obscenity of any particular material. 
In this case, the evidence in "cne trial court: was sufficient to 
reach required limits, and by holding that it was not, the Court of 
Appeals has substituted its qualitative idea of obscenity for the 
judicially approved minimum definition of that troublesome concept. 




INDEPENDENT REVIEW BY AN APPELLATE COURT IS A LIMITED REVIEW 
It is clear that an appellate court has a duty to review the 
jury verdict in this case to assure the Turner depictions fall 
within the substantive limitations suggested in Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). The 
City has never denied that. At issue between the parties is the 
extent of that review. Such appellate review is for the purpose of 
rejecting a jury verdict if it does not meet uhe minimum "threshold 
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of obscenity elements necessary to prevent an erosion of protected 
First Amendment rights. Review is not for the purpose of making a 
new and total determination of obscenity, with entire disregard of 
the jury findings and substitution of its own findings. Turner1s 
characterization of the appellate role as "de novo11 implies a full 
factual finding as to obscenity by an appellate court not having 
full access to either the questionable material or its displayer. 
1. Fixing a Threshold is Not Equivalent to Determining 
Obscenity. What does Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 94 S.Ct. 
2150, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974), relied upon heavily by Turner, inzend 
for the appellate court to "independently review"? "Constitutional 
claims when necessary." Turner has made a constitutional claim 
that the City violated his right of free speech. While appellate 
courts are generally limited to a consideration of fact questions, 
in an obscenity case certain fact issues are framed as 
"constitutional facts" akin to a law question. Infringement upon 
First: Amendment rights is an error of law that should be corrected 
by an appellate court. However, this does not open the door to 
determination by the appellate court of all the facts. A role is 
necessarily preserved for the jury. 
2. Jurv Role. Determination of obscenity is the jury's 
province. A constitutional threshold, such as the minimum 
requirement for "patent offensiveness", may be met without a jury 
necessarily finding material to be obscene. The appellate court's 
province is to reject the jury's verdict only if it: fails to meet: 
or exceed a minimum standard. Should a jury verdict be overridden 
or disregarded every time request is made for appellate review? 
Obviously not; a de novo review of the entire factual 
determination of obscenity would obviate the role of a jury. The 
appellate court should make a quantified review of the evidence to 
determine that substantive thresholds are met and proper standards 
applied by the jury, not to make a de novo determination of all 
fact issues. If an appellate court were to undertake the latter, 
there would be no way of properly applying community standards, for 
instance. 
3, Applicable Law. Appellate assurance that thresholds are 
met without supplanting the jury's role is the balance required by 
the cases. Bose v. Consumer Unions of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 
(1984), cited by Turner, defines the Court's role as "marking out 
the limits of a standard11. It permits appellate consideration to 
be made on a case-by-case basis, recognizing that there are 
categories "to which the majestic protection of the First Amendment 
does not extend because they 'are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step 
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality1 Chaplinsky 
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 86 L.Ed. 1031, 62 S.Ct. 766 
(1942)." Bose 466 U.S. at 504. The appellate role is to 
"independently decide whether the evidence in the record is 
sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold" that would 
otherwise bar the entry of judgment. Bose, 511. The facts must 
necessarily be analyzed and reviewed, but need the appellate court 
4 
do so beyond what is necessary to verify that those facts have been 
safely shepherded across that line between speech unconditionally 
guaranteed and speech which may be legitimately regulated? No. 
Rather, the courts define the area in which the local community may 
chart its own course in dealing with obscene materials, and the 
appellate court need only verify that the trier of fact has stayed 
within that area. Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton, 431 U.S. 49, 53-
54, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446, decided in 1973 at the same time 
as Miller v. California, supra. Otherwise, a trial de novo would 
be an automatic consequence of any and every appeal, and the 
statement of Brennan in his dissent in Paris Adult Theater, supra, 
repeated in his dissent to Jenkins v. Georgia, supra, would be a 
correct observation: 
"And the careful efforts of state and lower federal 
courts to apply the standard will remain an essentially 
pointless exercise, in view of the need for an ultimate 
decision by this Court." 
Under the law, determination of a threshold is not equal to finding 
the ultimate fact of obscenity. The Court of Appeals here has gone 
beyond the mere duty of independent review, thereby diminishing the 
intended function of the jury. 
POINT II 
TURNER MATERIALS MEET THE CONSTITUTIONAL THRESHOLD 
While the materials in each case must be examined by an 
appellate court, it need not revisit every detail of the trial but 
rather can teasure then by the yardstick cf types and classes. 
Both Jenkins v, Georgia, supra, cited by Turner, and Miller v. 
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California, supra, cited by the City, give examples of such types 
or classes of materials that may be properly considered obscene. 
Both listings include "lewd exhibition of the genitals. " The 
materials in the case at hand are of that type or class; the bare 
midriff of Jenkins was not within that or any other. The examples 
listed by the cases are intended to help define the threshold 
within relatively general parameters. Fine-tuning beyond that 
point and actual determination of obscenity is a function of the 
community standard as applied by the local jury. The Court of 
nppeaxs Dozn in une majority opinion anc in z.ne cissenz scucjnz tc 
characterize the degree of explicity of the drawings, and yet the 
wall hangings in their full size, context and degree of detail were 
viewed only by the trial judge and jury. The blown-up display of 
any vagina in a public store without an ameliorating context is 
sufficiently lewd to fall within a described class and exceed the 
threshold; determination by an appellate court that one genital is 
presented in such detail that it is too salacious for public 
display while another vagina is not and, ergo, may be displayed 
disregards the threshold classification afforded by case law. 
Most of the specific cases cited by Turner dealing with 
defined materials are prior to Miller, supra, and from a lower 
court, but none of them hold categorically that exposed genitalia 
with nothing more cannot be obscene. To do so would contradict 
specific statements of the U. S. Supreme Court. The Court of 
Appeals concluded that the drawings are "not public portrayals of 
hard core sexual conduct for its own sake". It is not explained 
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what purpose there was in creating or displaying the material if 
not to convey a sexual message, albeit more disgusting and base 
than erotic• Further, while crude, the purpose of display in this 
context would not have been altered if drawings in similar scale 
and detail were carefully done by a master painter or even if they 
were photographs. 
POINT III 
EEXPOSURE TO MINORS MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS AN APPROPRIATE ELEMENT OF 
JURY CONSIDERATION 
Contrary to what is argued by Turner, evidence was presented 
and allowed in the trial court regarding patronage of Turner1 s shop 
by students and other minors (Trial Transcript, p.236, for 
example) , and the likelihood of minors patronizing the shop was 
discussed by the Court of Appeals in its decision. The City has 
never taken the position that exposure to juveniles would cause a 
standard other than Miller to be applied; it only urges that this 
fact may soften the rigidity with which the Miller standards are 
applied. Miller itself recognizes increased danger when the mode 
of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of exposure 
to juveniles. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 19. It challenges 
Brennan's suggestion in the dissent that a different test be 
applied in the case of juveniles (Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 
27) and recommends that the test it formulates be applied to 
obscenity in every circumstance. That does not prevent the 
application of the Miller standards with some heightened 
sensitivity where minors are involved. This Court in State v. 
Haig, 578 P.2d 8 37 (1978) recognizes that the community may take 
note of a context which involves exposure to juveniles in applying 
the Miller test (concurring opinion at 843). 
POINT IV 
THE BED SHEET DECOR IS NOT UNITED BY A THEME 
Does the work, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient 
interest? So reads the Miller language in setting forth the 
second, or prurient interest, prong of the test. Where composite 
material is involved (the bed sheets) as opposed to material that 
is fairly unified in content (a single movie), however, the scope 
of the prurient interest standard does not require a court to try 
and embrace the entirety of items displayed together but which bear 
little or no relation to each other in order to create a "whole". 
The notion that an isolated excerpt could be extracted from a book 
and found to be obscene, as in Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.D. 360 
(1868), was rejected by a series of cases involving novels, such as 
United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses,", 5 Fed.Supp. 182 
(S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2nd Circuit 1934). What is 
clear fron the evolution of these cases is that the "taken as a 
whole" concept was intended to apply to thematic materials - such 
as novels. Miller, for example, refers to "the work". Materials 
that comprise a single work, or which are united in some way by a 
theme, must be taken as a whole. On the other hand, material that 
is made up of various thematic units, or unrelated features, is not 
S 
intended by the courts to be taken as a whole just because it has 
been assembled into the same presentation. 
The drawings and descriptions on the Turner bad sheets have no 
more theme or interrelationship than do the totality of paintings 
hanging in the Louvre. Several photographs that might otherwise be 
obscene, when used to illustrate a non-obscene article to which 
they are thematically related, are constitutionally redeemed 
because of the unit concept of the entire article. That does not 
mean that an article obscene in its entirety, photographs and text, 
would be constitutionally redeemed because ix: is placed inzo a 
magazine containing other, unrelated articles that are not obscene. 
The Court in Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, did not consider the 
entire newspapers it reviewed as wholes, but rather confined its 
application of the "taken as a whole" test to two individual 
articles or sections within those newspapers. The discussion by 
the dissent in the Court of Appeals decision, 813 P.2d at 1200, 
correctly elaborates on the "unit of perception" as constituting 
the "work" to which the prurient interest prong of Miller must be 
applied. 
Turner primarily argues the "taken as a whole" concept as a 
part of the third prong of the Miller test (serious literary, 
artistic, political or scientific value), citing City of Urbana v. 
Downing, 539 N.E.2d 140 (Ohio 1989), which deals with that third 
prong. However, it might be noted that the Court of Appeals 
applies "taken as a whole" in support of its refusal to find an 
appeal to the prurient interest, the second prong. 
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POINT V 
TURNER HAS NOT CROSS-APPEALED, AND THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER 
POINTS NOT ASSIGNED AS ERROR BY THE CITY 
Two arguments are presented by Turner for consideration in 
this Court which are the subject of decision by the Court of 
Appeals and not appealed from. A party not filing a cross appeal 
should not be allowed to seek to sustain reversal of a lower court 
verdict and judgment on points where the intermediate court did not 
reverse the lower court. As the action of the Court of Appeals 
varied in each case, tne two arguments will joe treated separately. 
A. Constitutionality of Ordinance. The Court of Appeals 
found the ordinance to be constitutional (decision, 813 P.2d at 
1191) ; Turner would have this Court find it unconstitutional and, 
in effect, overrule the intermediate court by reversing the trial 
court decision in that regard. Turner correctly states that an 
appellate court should affirm the judgment of the lower court where 
possible, even if it must do so on grounds different from those 
relied upon by the lower court. However, that rule-does not have 
proper application to the case at hand. Here the Court of Appeals 
specifically ruled upon the constitutionality of the ordinance; as 
to that issue, the court made a decision, and we are not presented 
with a need to support it through some reasoning different from 
that used by the Court of Appeals. Rather a modification of the 
decision in that regard can only be made by overruling it. A 
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typical statement of the rule urged by Turner is found in Lewis & 
Sons Construction Co. v. General Insurance Company, 30 Utah2d 290, 
517 P.2d 539, 540: 
"Whether or not the judge gave the correct reason for his 
ruling is of no importance, since he should be affirmed 
if he reached the correct result." 
The case at hand is different because Turner disagrees with the 
result itself, not just the reasoning used to arrive at that 
result. If the Court of Appeals had failed to mention 
unconstitutionality of the ordinance as a basis for its decision, 
and it were in face unconstitutional, tnis court might properly 
supply that lack of constitutionality as a better basis for the 
decision of the intermediate court. However, that court 
specifically dealt with constitutionality, and it clearly decided 
the ordinance was constitutional. This Court cannot alter that 
without reversing the intermediate court, and that would require an 
appeal by Turner. 
B. Turner Argues that the Citv Failed to Meet its Burden of 
Proof, and that the Court of Appeals did not Address that Issue. 
The Court of Appeals treats burden of proof as an inherent part of 
an issue it did address: whether the obscenity ordinance was 
properly applied to Turner. (See decision, 813 P2d at 1190) 
Whether the City met its burden of proof in the lower court was a 
necessary consideration by the Court of Appeals in making its 
decision, and the matter cannot be separated out from that 
decision. The issues examined by the Court of Appeals and the 
requirement that the City meet certain thresholds posed by the 
II 
Miller test amount to an evaluation of the City!s burden of proof 
and the extent to which it was met. 
The question of whether the City nei its burden, while a legal 
question in one sense, involves primarily issues of fact, and 
becomes the law of the case so as to preclude re-examination of the 
evidence outside of the area assigned as error and from which 
appeal is taken, unless it appears that the Court of Appeal's 
decision was based upon mistaken facts or will result in manifest 
injustice. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins, Co. v. Roosth, (CA5) 306 F.2d 
110; 111. C.G.R. Co. v. International Paper Co. ^1385, Ck5j 385 
F.2d 536. The question of whether the City bore the burden of 
proving each element of the crime was presented to the Court of 
Appeals, and consideration by it of that burden of proof was 
necessary to the decision it rendered. People v. Pacini (1981) 120 
Cal.App. 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. 820. As part of the law of the case 
emerging from that Court of Appeals, this point should not now be 
reviewed except to the extent it was appealed from by the City. 
Notwithstanding the position taken by the City in this Point 
V, the two improper arguments will be discussed. 
POINT VI 
THE ST, GEORGE OBSCENITY ORDINANCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS PACE. 
The Court of Appeal's opinion does not dispute, and it should 
be evident, that the elements contained in the St. George ordinance 
are sufficient to sustain it against ordinary constitutional 
attack. See, for example, Miller v. California, 413 U.S., at 25, 
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tnd Hamlincr v. United States, 418 U.S. at 114, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 
li.Ed.2d 590; State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837 at 845 (Utah, 1978). 
Though it may not be "narrowly tailored", the ordinance is 
reasonably related to the legitimate goal of prohibiting exhibition 
of obscene material. The diagnosis by Turner of the infirmity of 
over-broadness rests upon the premise that for First Amendment 
purposes an ordinance that proscribes anything less than some form 
of sexual action is unconstitutional. That premise is demonstrably 
erroneous and cannot be consistently applied. To find overbreadth 
in the phrase "lewd exhibition of the genitalsi;, even as expanded 
by addition of "including any explicit close-up representation of 
a human genital organ or a spread-eagle exposure of female genital 
organs," is to forbid the City from drafting legislation based on 
Supreme Court precedent. Miller, supra, does not limit its test 
to sexual action when it states "patently offensive representations 
or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, (action) and 
lewd exhibition of the genitals (non-action) .,! The Miller court 
goes on to state that "sex and nudity may not be exploited without 
limit by . . . pictures exhibited . . . in places of public 
accommodation", and in that context "nudity", while referring to 
nudity that is obscene, does not in any way infer "sexual action". 
Following the hallmark effort in Miller to define "obscenity", no 
case has held a lewd display of genitals to be outside of that 
definition. 
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While not properly at issue before this Court, the 
constitutionality of the St. George obscenity ordinance was 
correctly decided by the Court of Appeals. 
POINT VII 
THE CITY MET ITS BURDEN OP PROOF 
Turner's argument that the City failed to sustain its burden 
of proof essentially maintains that the City failed to pass the 
Miller test. Sufficiency cf the City's presentation to the trial 
court in that regard is at the core of tne decision by the Ccart cf 
Appeals. While that decision makes scant reference to the third 
prong of the Miller test, it was nonetheless before the court, and 
it must be assumed that the Miller test was applied in its entirety 
by the Court of Appeals in rendering its decision. 
Even if that were not so, the trial court properly decided the 
wall hangings were obscene as defined by the City ordinance which 
requires that they have no serious literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value. A prosecutor is no longer required to show that 
a work is "utterly without redeeming social value11, as in Memoirs 
v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419, 86 S.Ct. 975, 16 L.Ed.2d 1, 
but rather a serious value standard is applied, making prosecution 
more reasonable. Evidence was presented to show that (1) there was 
no attempt to create a serious statement (Trial Transcript, p. 2 3 2; 
p. 240) and (2) there was no message of any significant value 
communicated (Trial Transcript, p. 296; p. 188). Aside from 
Turner himself, who is unable to ascribe any serious intent or 
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valuable effect to the drawings, the defense put on only one 
witness who was shown pictures of the material in question• His 
sole comment on the value or significance of the drawings taken as 
a whole is at page 283 of the Transcript, lines 21-25: 
"Well, taken as a whole, it appears to be a work, 
essentially, of graffiti with a number of slogans, which 
allude to kinds of issues — I don't know if they're 
important issues. Some of them appear to be issues-
oriented kinds of things that are common in media today." 
The prosection's burden in the trial court was to establish every 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; the quantum of 
evidence the law demands was found by the trial court to be 
present. The Court of Appeals has challenged the lower court 
decision on two of the Miller prongs only, and it is to these that 
review by this Court should be limited. 
Miller affirms the commitment of the courts to guard against 
"any infringement of genuinely serious literary, artistic, 
political or scientific expression" (emphasis added). The adverb 
"genuinely" calls for a sensible perspective in evaluating whether 
Turner seriously intended to make a specific statement of any 
value. The gossamer claim that the material has serious value is 
more pretense than reality, and the Appellate Court properly 
declined to give any meaningful consideration to that prong of the 
Miller test as applied to these materials. Proper inquiry is 
whether a reasonable person would find serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value in the material, taken as a whole, 
according to Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 
95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987), and there is no requirement that the City 
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produce expert testimony or introduce scholarly treatises in order 
to analyze the material. In Pope v. Illinois, supra, the State 
called only two witnesses: the arresting detective and an officer 
to identify photographs of the bookstore. See People v. Pope, 138 
111. App. 3d at 732-33, 486 N.E.2d at 353. 
CONCLUSION 
At bottom, the Court of Appeal's reversal for failure to 
satisfy the first two prongs of Killer appears to misapprehend the 
appropriate scope of inquiry into the context-specific but 
predominantly legal issue of minimum thresholds. The sensitive 
balance between constitutional rights and local community interests 
must be carefully maintained in making that inquiry. Important 
constitutional rights cannot be left to the personal prejudices or 
passions of jurors, nor can the fundamental right of a community to 
determine its own values be ignored. In the event the former may 
tend to overshadow the latter, it would be well to remain aware of 
the admonition of Justices Berger and Renquist in dissent, Schad v. 
Mt. Eohraim, 452 U.S. 61 at 87, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671: 
"The fact that a form of expression enjoys some 
constitutional protection does not mean that there are 
not times and places inappropriate for its exercise. The 
towns and villages of this Nation are not, and should not 
be, forced into a mold cast by this Court. Citizens 
should be free to choose to shape their community so that 
it embodies their conception of the 'decent life1." 
The facts here are different, of course, as the material is only to 
be or afforded constitutional protection if not obscene, but the 
perspective to be used in a balancing of rights is the same; 
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Miller must be applied with sufficient good sense that both the 
rights of the individual and the rights of the community are 
blended in a fair and reasonable exercise of government. 
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